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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
APPELLATE BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

MARKFIXMER,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

:

Ct. App. No. 20010241-CA
Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review cases such as this where the
magistrate dismissed counts because the state failed to present sufficient evidence for a bindover.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999 Replacement).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the state present a sufficient quantum of evidence to support a bindover for trial?
This court reviews a magistrate's bindover decision as a question of law without deference to
court's decision below. State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(b) and 58-37d-5(l)(a)(c)(d)(f) and (g).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statefiledseparate informations againstfivepeople See State v. Kelson, Case No
001600172, State v. Fixmer, Case No 001600173, State v. Hoppe, 001600174, State v.
Guertzgen, Case No 001600175, State v. McLaughlan, Case No 001600176 Hoppe, Kelson
and McLaughlin were arrested at a separate locationfromFixmer and Guertzgen, although each
was charged with similar offenses After the preliminary hearing, the court dismissed the
clandestine laboratory charges against Kelson and Hoppe The statefiledpetitions for
interlocutory review on the Kelson and Hoppe cases, McLaughlin's case was not appealed The
Utah Supreme Court "remanded the [Kelson and Hoppe] cases to the Court of Appeals with
instructions to reverse the magistrate's order quashing the bindover against both defendants, and
binding both defendants over on thefirstdegree felony charges " See Notice Case Nos
20010149 & 20010151
Mr Fixmer's case was dismissed and the state sought review of that dismissal order (The
Dismissal Order is attached as Addendum "A") At the time the appeal wasfiled,the Utah Court
of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear this matter Utah Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999
Replacement)l Despite the state's repeated attempts to consolidate Mr Fixmer's case with the
Kelson and Hoppe cases,2 and requests for summary reversal, the court of appeals denied those
motions ruling that Mr Fixmer's case "is factually distinguishable from the companion cases
" See Order Denying Summary Reversal (attached as Addendum "C")

1

The jurisdiction statute was amended after the notice of appeal wasfiledin this case
The Utah Supreme Court now has original jurisdiction over the dismissal offirstdegree felonies
2

Appellee's Objection to Motion for Summary Reversal is attached as Addendum "B"
2

Appellee argued that there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Fixmer constructively
possessed drug paraphernalia and stolen property, and there was no evidence that he intended to
operate a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. That was because Mr. Fixmer neither
possessed drugs nor precursor chemicals. Moreover, he argued that being "duped" into storing
lab equipment and even knowing that lab equipment was in the garage, as argued by the state, was
insufficient evidence to support the bindover. See Objection to Motion for Summary Reversal.
This court agreed with appellee, refused to summarily reverse the magistrate, and ordered the
parties to brief the issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a bindover of the charges against
Mr. Fixmer. He did not possess laboratory equipment or supplies and had no intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that he received,
retained, or disposed of property of another with the intent to permanently deprive or that he
possessed drug paraphernalia. The magistrate properly applied the probable cause standard
outline by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clark, 20 P. 3d 300 (Utah 2001) in refusing to
bindover this case. Appellee asks this court to uphold the magistrate's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 11, 2000, at approximately 3:00 to 3:30 a.m., Summit County Deputies
Mike Grant and Milton Cox were patrolling "the area of Silver Summit and Trailside Park." Trial
Record, 91 (hereinafter "R"). The deputies observed "a pickup pulling a trailer being followed by
two four-wheelers." R. 91. Robert McLaughlin was driving one of the four-wheelers, R. 92,
Amanda Kelson was driving the other, while Karl Hoppe was driving the pickup truck. R. 96.
3

McLaughlin was arrested for DUI. R. 93-94. While being handcuffed, McLaughlin threw a small
container with methamphetamine into the weeds by the side of the road. R. 94.
The closest residence to the pickup truck and four-wheelers was 100 to 150 feet away. R
95. While questioning McLaughlin, police noticed that Kelson5 s four-wheeler and the trailer
attached to the pickup lacked registration stickers. R. 96. They also learned that Hoppe's license
was suspended. R. 96. The police conducted impound searches of the truck and four-wheelers,
R. 97,findingplastic coolers and tarps tied to the back of the four-wheelers. R. 97. Upon
opening the coolers, police found chemicals and other items thought to be consistent with a umeth
lab." R 97, 148.
The chemicals found inside the coolers included hydrochloric acid, pseudoephedrine, and
iodine.3 See Exhibits 1, 31 and 25-30. Drug Enforcement Agent Shannon Carrizal testified that
these items are "typically found when investigating or processing a clandestine meth lab." R. 157.
Carrizal also stated that the PH testing kits, the two burner Coleman stove, round bottom flasks,
condenser columns, and rubber hoses, found with the chemicals on the four-wheelers, were items
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. R. 157-58. A vent bag which is a device "used for
trapping phosphene gas during methamphetamine production . . . ," was also found on a fourwheeler. R. 158, Exhibit 26.
After searching the four-wheelers and arresting Hoppe, McLaughlin and Kelson, police
obtained a warrant to search the residence at 747 Richmond Drive. R 97. That residence was
located "a couple hundred yards down the road . . ."fromthe location of the four-wheelers. R.

3

Iodine and pseudoephedrine are precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
4

112. Police arrived at the home at 10:30 a.m., R. 98, 113, and found Page Geurtzgen and Mark
Fixmer inside. R. 114. Mr. Fixmer was in bed, R. 114, Mr. Geurtzgen answered the door. R.
107.
Police seized a number of itemsfromthe home. See Exhibits 1 & 2, Items #1 through #9;
Exhibits 3 through 24. The items found in the home on the inventory list are identified as follows:
Item Number

Item Description

1

Pressure cooker w/ unknown liquid
substance, approx 600 ml

1a

Sample of Exhibit # 1

2

Glass container (450 ml) w/unk liquid

2a

Sample of Exhibit #2

3

Glass pipe with unknown white
powder substance

3a

Sample of #3

4

2 whitefilterswith white powder substance

4a

Sample #4

5

Spoon and plastic straws w/ white residue

6

Ladle w/ white powdered substance

6a

Sample #6

7

Metal box with paraphernalia (glass
pipe/zig zags/forceps/glass bottles)

8

2 rubber hoses

9

Fingerprint from Exhibit #2
5

State's Exhibit 2.4
The samplesfromthe items identified above, items la, 2a, 3a, 4a, and 6a, were taken to
the Utah State Crime Laboratory for testing to determine if those items were "from a meth lab."
See State's Exhibit 31. No controlled substances or precursor chemicals used in the manufacture
of methamphetamine were found in any of the items takenfromthe house. States's Exhibit 31.
In fact, the state's attorney dismissed the possession count against Mr. Fixmer "based on the fact
that there was no positive lab result for controlled substance." R. 186. The police also found no
comparable finger prints of Mr. Fixmer's on any of the glassware seizedfromthe four-wheelers,
see State's Exhibit 33, or on the items fingerprinted in the garage. R. 152, States's Exhibit 33.
Whilefirstresponding officer Grant thought some of the items in the home might be drug
paraphernalia, R. 104, he acknowledged that police often have suspected paraphernalia or lab
equipment tested at the crime lab for the presence of controlled substances or precursors . R. 115.
Grant saw nothing resembling a meth lab, R. 115, found no precursor chemicals associated with
the manufacture of methamphetamine in the home, R.116, and discovered no drug or precursor
residue on any of the seized items. See State's Exhibit, 31.
Agent Craig Hicken, who works for the Utah Criminal Investigation Unit, in noting a
shade over the garage window at 747 Richmond Avenue, stated, "it's common for persons who
have laboratories to shade their windows . . . ." R. 136. See also State's Exhibit 13. He also
thought that common garden hose, found in the garage, could be used "in one of the processes of
producing methamphetamine," R. 137, State's Exhibit 22, and that the flat bottom flask, found in
the garage next to the power steering fluid, could be used "in the methamphetamine production."
4

The other items identified in State's Exhibit 2 were found on the four-wheelers.
6

R 137 Although he could not identify yellow stains found in the garage, R 138, State's Exhibit
20, he nonetheless testified that he typically sees "yellowish type stains in a methamphetamine
lab " R 139 Finally he told the court that the Coleman propane fuel cannister, found in the
kitchen, is also "used sometimes in the production

" of methamphetamine R 139, State's

Exhibit 6
When Hicken entered the home at 747 Richmond, he wore a phosphene gas detector R
144 Phosphene is an airborne residual gas associated with the production of methamphetamine
R 145 Hicken neither observed evidence of phosphene gas nor detected it with his scientific
equipment R 144-45 He also did not test the vent bag found on the four-wheeler for the
presence of phosphene, R 148, as the purpose of the bag "is not to allow the gas to escape " R
153
Hicken acknowledged that the garden hose depicted in State's Exhibit 22, could be
purchased in any hardware store R 145 More importantly, chemicals would have to travel
through the hoses as part of methamphetamine production process, but in this case, "[tjhere was
no residue noted on the hoses [and] [t]hey were not tested " R 145 Finally, he found no
"chemicals associated with the production of methamphetamine in the flask [or] in the yellow
stains

" found on the floor R 146
Drug Enforcement Administration Agent (DEA) Shannon Carrizal assisted with

processing the evidence in this case R 155 He testified that theflatbottomflaskfound on the
garage shelf could be used in the methamphetamine production process R 160 He felt that the
hosing, and cotton balls found in the house could also be used as part of a methamphetamine
production process R 160-61 Carrizal stated that if theflatbottomflaskwas used to produce
7

methamphetamine, the crime lab would be able to detect chemicals associated with that
production process, R. 163, but no such chemicals were detected here. State's Exhibit 31.
Summit County Sheriff Detective Brad Wilde interviewed Mark Fixmer on the date the
search warrant was executed. That interview was tape recorded, but police lost the tape before
the preliminary hearing. R. 54. Nonetheless, Wilde testified that:
Mark [Fixmer] said that he didn't really know Karl [Hoppe] that much, and John
[McLaughlin] for that matter, that they was Page's [Geurtzgen]friends,I believe is the
word he used. [Fixmer] indicated that some time around the 4th of July Karl had brought
up two four-wheelers, that I believe he said something to the affect(sic) that he, asked if
he could leave the four-wheelers at Mark's house, and that the four-wheelers wasn't
registered, and that he didn't want cem to ride cem.
R. 177.
Mr. Fixmer admitted riding the four-wheelers a few times during the summer. R. 177
Later on during the summer Hoppe brought items to the house represented to be camping
equipment which he asked to store in the corner of the garage. R. 178.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Fixmer argued that the state failed to
present sufficient evidence to support a bindover. The court agreed and dismissed the case.
L THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A SUFFICIENT QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MR. FIXMER POSSESSED
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN A
CLANDESTINE LAB OPERATION OR THAT HE WAS A PARTY TO
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY OR THAT HE POSSESSED DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA
A. Summary of Argument
Appellee will explain below the standards that a magistrate must follow in evaluating a
case like this when the state seeks to show constructive possession. The argument begins with a
review of the probable cause standard at preliminary hearings. The second part explains
8

constructive possession case law and its application here. The succeeding section provides an
overview of reasonable suspicion/probable cause case law which is applicable to this court's
analysis in light of the probable cause standard set forth in State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah
2001). Finally, Appellee will demonstrate why the magistrate correctly applied the proper
standard in dismissing this case.
B. Bindover Standard
The Utah Supreme Court recently defined the probable cause standard for a preliminary
hearing:
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary
hearing by 'presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the 'crime charged has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it.' At this stage of the proceeding, 'the
evidence required to show probable cause is relatively low because the assumption is that
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues. Accordingly,
'when faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh evidence but
must leave those tasks 'to thefinderof fact at trial.' Instead, 'the magistrate must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the prosecution.
State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 303 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court further clarified the standard by holding that the "quantum of
evidence necessary to support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict
motion." Clark, 20 P.3d at 305. The court analogized the preliminary hearing standard to the
arrest warrant probable cause standard, id., noting, however, as a practical matter, that the state
still has a "higher bar" at a preliminary hearing because an accused has the right to cross-examine
witnesses and present evidence, two rights which are unavailable in the ex parte issuance of an
arrest warrant. Id. n. 3. The court nonetheless emphasized the magistrate's gatekeeping function
"to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted out no later than the
9

preliminary hearing . . .," observing that the magistrate "is n o t . . . a rubber stamp for the
prosecution." Ttf. at 303 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)).
C. Constructive Possession
"In order to prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus between the accused
and the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused had both the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Reed, Case No. 99093-CA (Utah App. 2000) (unpublished opinion)
(defendant who lived in a home for three weeks before discovery of controlled substance
precursors and laboratory equipment is insufficient to demonstrate constructive possession).5
Utah courts have repeatedly held that mere presence at a location where illegal drugs are found is
insufficient to establish a nexus between the defendant and the drug. Id.; see State v. Layman,
985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999)(evidence insufficient to show that defendant constructively possessed
drugs and paraphernalia found inside passenger's pouch during traffic stop); State v. Fox, 709
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) ("knowledge and ability to possess do equal possession where there is
no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." ); Spanish Fork City v. Bryan,
975 P.2d 501 (Utah App. 1999) (knowledge of purported drug paraphernalia found in home that
accused shared with another, is insufficient without more, to support conviction).
In evaluating constructive possession, the courts consider the facts of each case mindful
that the ultimate test is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drugs or
paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the accused "had the power and intent to exercise
control over the drugs and paraphernalia." Layman, 985 P.2d at 914. Although there is no
5

This opinion is attached as Addendum "D"
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specific check list of factors, Utah courts consider things like incriminating statements, suspicious
or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of the accused to location of
drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on the accused's person, Solas, 820 P.2d at 1388, and
evidence that the accused was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the
contraband or drugs. Bryan, 975 P.2d at 503.
D. Mere Presence is Insufficient to Support Bindover
Mere presence at the scene of a crime without more is insufficient to support a reasonable
suspicion to stop and detain, and is clearly insufficient to support a level III encounter, the
standard most closely applicable to support a bindover. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed.
2d (1979) (mere presence of person in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise
to reasonable suspicion that such person is involved in criminal activity); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d
592, 595 (Utah App. 1992)("presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity"); State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App.
1992) (accused's mere presence at house suspected of drug activity does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) ("A
'persons mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.").
E. The Magistrate Applied the Proper Standard in Not Binding This Matter Over for Trial
In this case, the state charged Mr. Fixmer with four offenses: I. Unlawful Possession of
Methamphetamine Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, afirstdegree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(b) and 58-37d-5(l)(a)(c)(d)(f) and (g); II. Receiving Stolen Property,
originally charged as a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, but
11

reduced to a class B misdemeanor at the preliminary hearing6; III. Possession of
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), which
was dismissed by state motion at the preliminary hearing;7 and IV. Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5.
To support a bindover, the state must present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Clark, 20 P.2d at
305. That means to support count I, the methamphetamine laboratory charge, the state must
present evidence that:
1. Mr. Fixmer knowingly and intelligently;
2. Possessed laboratory equipment or supplies;
3. With the intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation; and
4. That the offense involved:
(a) possession of one or more firearms;
(b) the illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance
of clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a substantial risk to human
health, safety, or danger to the environment;
(c) said intended laboratory operation was to take or did take place within 500 feet
or a residence, place of business, church, or school;
(d) said clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a
specified controlled substance; or
(e) the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of a
methamphetamine base.
See Information, Count I.
Count II requires the state to present a sufficient quantum of evidence to show:
1. Mr. Fixmer received, retained, or disposed of property of another;
2. Knowing said property had been stolen with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
6

The state does not appeal the reduction from a second degree felony to a class B
misdemeanor.
7

This count is also not part of the appeal.
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Count III, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, requires proof that:
1. Mr. Fixmer used or possessed with intent to use;
2. Drug paraphernalia;
3. To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance in the human body.
Here, the state failed to present "sufficient evidence" to support the bindover. The state
presented no evidence that Mr .Fixmer knowingly or intelligently possessed laboratory equipment
or precursor chemicals. There were no precursor chemicals or methamphetamine found in the
home8 and the three experienced drug agents all stated that they observed no methamphetamine or
lab in the house. R. 115-16, R.66, R.85. When applying the factors identified in constructive
possession cases, it is clear that Mr. Fixmer neither sold drugs nor possessed drugs, was not
found to be using illegal drugs, and no drugs were found on his person, Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388.
The closest drugs were found over 200 yards away on the persons of Kelson and McLaughlin,
and there is no suggestion that he participated in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs with
them. See Layman, 985 P.2d at 914 (a defendant cannot be found in constructive possession of
drugs found on another person unless the state can prove he had the power and intent to exercise
control over the drugs); see also Bryan, 975 P.2d at 503.
An additional important factor in the court's bindover decision was that Mr. Fixmer was
not the sole occupant of the home. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320 (occupancy of home containing
illegal drugs is insufficient to support conviction unless state can show intent to exercise dominion
and control over drugs); Reed, Case No. 990973 (court of appeals upholds Magistrate's decision

8

The state dismissed the controlled substance charge when the state laboratory reported
no controlled substances or precursor chemicals were found in the house.
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to dismiss casefindingthat Reed's occupancy of home with others was insufficient to show
constructive possession of meth lab). Here, Page Guertzgen, who also occupied the home,
answered the door when police knocked, and was closely associated with Hoppe and
McLaughlin, the two found in actual possession of the lab equipment. Interestingly, Guertzgen
fled the jurisdiction after his arrest, a fact suggesting consciousness of guilt. See State v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983). Moreover, Mr. Fixmer told police that any items left in the garage
were put there by Guertzgen's friends. R. 177. He denied ownership of any of the seized items.
There was additionally no evidence that Mr. Fixmer exercised dominion and control over
any of the items found on the four-wheelers. He barely knew the people in actual possession of
the lab equipment, who were insteadfriendsof the other tenant, Page Guertzgen. R. 177. Mr.
Fixmer never observed the items left in the garage, believing that anything left in the garage by
Hoppe was camping equipment.9 Even if Mr. Fixmer knew that the items were lab equipment, the
state still failed to show that he intended to exercise dominion and control over those items. Fox,
P.2d at 321 (A person's knowledge of the presence of illegal dmgs in his home is not illegal if the
person did not exercise dominion and control over the drugs).
Similarly, there was no evidence to show that Mr. Fixmer had direct or exclusive control
over the garage area or over any other purported paraphernalia items found in the home. See
Fox, 709 P.2d at 321; Reed, (court appropriately upheld dismissal when there was no evidence
that accused had control over room where laboratory was found). Indeed, it is questionable
whether any of the items here are paraphernalia since neither drugs, drug residue, nor precursor

9

As demonstrated in State's Exhibits 27-30 and by officer Grant's testimony, the lab
materials were sealed in closed containers and not in plain view R. 19
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chemicals were found in the home or on any of the seized items. In any event, no witness testified
that Mr. Fixmer exercised dominion and control over the items, and there was certainly no
evidence that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed the items on the four-wheelers. See Laymen,
985 P.2d at 1389.
In addition to the intent element, the state must also present evidence that the items
possessed by Mr. Fixmer were part of a methamphetamine lab. The unidentified yellow stains,
shaded windows, common garden hose, and cotton balls were not part of a meth lab here, since
each officer testified that chemical residue would normally be found on the items if used in a
clandestine lab. Here, nothing suggesting an operational lab was found. The beaker found on the
garage shelf, which police said could be used to manufacture methamphetamine, was extensively
tested by a toxicologist at the state crime laboratory. There were neither controlled substances
nor precursors found on the beaker or in the liquid inside. State's Exhibit 31. Moreover, there
were no precursor chemicals found near the beaker, and nothing to suggest that Mr. Fixmer
exercised control over the beaker. In short the state also failed in its burden on the second
element as there was no lab equipment in the home.
Even if Mr. Fixmer knew about the items on the four-wheelers, there still is no evidence
that he "intended to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation." See Fox,
709 P.2d at 321. The state makes two arguments in its brief: (1) "that [Mr. Fixmer] had been
duped into storing the meth lab equipment and supplies, stolen four-wheelers, and drug
paraphernalia inside his home and garage, or (2) that [Mr. Fixmer] knew the meth lab equipment
and supplies, stolen four-wheelers and drug paraphernalia in his home and garage were
contraband." Under either theory, the state has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
15

bindover. Being "duped" into storing meth lab equipment shows no intent to engage in a lab
operation. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 321; Reed, Case No. 990973. The state has accordingly failed
to meet its burden on this crucial element of the case. Similarly, simple knowledge of meth lab
equipment is equally insufficient to show an intent to manufacture. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 321.
Moreover, knowledge that illegal items are in a home is not against the law unless the state can
demonstrate an accused's intent to exercise dominion and control over the items. Here, the state
by its own admission, concedes that the evidence is insufficient on this element, even considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.
Mr. Fixmer's proximity to the other defendant's is likewise an insufficient basis to support
a bindover. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.ED. 2d (1979) (mere presence of person in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that such
person is involved in criminal activity); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah App.
1992)("presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity"); State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1992) (Accused's mere
presence at house suspected of drug activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) ("A 'persons mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
cause to search that person."). Here, Kelson, Hoppe, and McLaughlin were found over 200 yards
awayfromthe home and there is no evidence they spoke with Mr. Fixmer on the day the parties
were arrested. Simply being near these people or even knowing they possessed drugs or lab
equipment is an insufficient basis to support a bindover. See e.g., Munsen, 821 P.2d at 14.
The arguments above apply equally to count II, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
16

count IV, possession of stolen property. First, there is no evidence that Mr. Fixmer knew the
four-wheelers were stolen. While he consented to allowing the storage of these vehicles in his
garage, he did not know that they were stolen. Likewise, if he was "duped" into storing the fourwheelers, as argued by the state, there can be no crime because there is no knowledge that the
vehicles were stolen.
Moreover, as argued above, the items found in the house were not used as drug
paraphernalia. Each item can be legally bought and possessed, no one stated that Mr. Fixmer
exercised dominion and control over the items, and no illegal drugs were found on or near the
paraphernalia. The state likewise failed to prove possession of drug paraphernalia.
CONCLUSION
In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, consistent with
the probable cause standard set forth in Clark, the magistrate did not err in refusing to bindover
the three remaining counts against Mr. Fixmer. There is insufficient evidence that he knowingly
or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment, stolen four-wheelers, and drug paraphernalia.
Additionally, they failed to show, even assuming Mr. Fixmer knew the lab equipment was
temporarily stored in the garage, that he intended to participate in a clandestine methamphetamine
operation.
Mr. Fixmer asks this court to uphold the Magistrate's order of dismissal.
DATED this

day ofJune, 2002.

ICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Appellee Mark Fixmer
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing APPELLATE BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following, this / / day of June, 2002
Assistant Attorney General Marian Decker
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FEB 2 3 2001
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
ROBERT J. McLAUGHLAN,

Case No. 001600176

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MARKFIXMER,
Defendant.

Case No. 001600173
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Preliminary hearing was held on the above two cases, and two other companion cases, on
January 16, 2001. Following receipt of evidence and argument, the court took the matter under
advisement as to the above two defendants to consider the applicable law. Based on the
stipulation of counsel, the court at this time defers ruling on the bindover of defendant Robert
McLaughlan, but as to defendant Mark Fixmer, the court rules as follows:
The court notes that Count III as to defendant Fixmer was dismissed on the State's
motion at the hearing. The court now DISMISSES the remaining counts. The court is very
aware of the probable cause standard for preliminary hearings, which standard was re-articulated
and clarified by the Utah Supreme Court on February 6, 2001, after this matter was heard. State
of Utah v. John Lamar Clark and Cory Howard Smith (consolidated cases for appeal), slip op.,
case numbers 990368 and 990798. The standard there set forth clearly applies to this case.
Justice Durrant expressly adopted the reasonable belief standard of probable cause that applies to
arrests.

Applying that standard here, the court recognizes that it heard credible evidence, meeting
the reasonable belief standard, that materials that may be used in a methamphetamine laboratory
were present in the home in which Mr. Fixer resided; that drug paraphernalia was in the same
residence; and that stolen ATV's had been stored at that residence until earlier the evening in
question.
There was no evidence of actual possession of methamphetamine laboratory supplies or
drug paraphernalia by Mr. Fixmer, and no evidence that Mr. Fixmer actually received or retained
the ATV's. Accordingly, the crux of plaintiff s case is constructive possession. As to each
remaining count, what is lacking is any credible evidence of a nexus between Mr. Fixmer and the
items in question. The case law provided by defendant clearly sets forth what is required to
establish the critical nexus. That evidence was not adduced at the preliminary hearing.
This Ruling will be the Order of Dismissal and no further order is required.
By the Cc

ftobett K.^ildej^DistncTCourt Judge
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ADDENDUM

RICHARD P. MAURO (5402)
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)363-9500
Attorney for Appellee, Mark Fixmer

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffiAppellant,

:

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY REVERSAL

:

v.

:

MARK FIXMER,

:

Dist. Ct. Case No. 001600173FS
Ct. App. No. 20010241

Defendant/Appellee.
Appellee, Mark Fixmer, through his attorney, Richard P. Mauro, herebyfilesthe following
objection, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(c), to appellant's motion for summary reversal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its motion for summary reversal, the state argues that the Utah Supreme Court's action
in two separate cases, involving separate defendants, should be a basis for a summary reversal of
the magistrate judge's action in failing to issue a bindover order in Mr. Fixmer's case.1
Mr. Fixmer was charged in a separate information, with a different case numberfromKarl
Hoppe and Amanda Kelson. He was charged with Possession of Methamphetamine Laboratory
Equipment, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(b); Receiving Stolen
1

The other cases, State v. Kelson, Case no. 20010524SC and State v. Hoppe, Case No.
20010523, were remanded to the magistrate court by the Utah Supreme Court for trial on a
methamphetamine laboratory charge. The Kelson and Hoppe cases were initially the subject of a
petition for an interlocutory appeal to this court and later petition for certiorari to the Utah
Supreme Court. Mr. Fixmer's case reached this court on direct appeal.

Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408,2 Possession of
Controlled Substance, to wit: methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),3 and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5.
On September 11, 2000, at approximately 3:30 p.m., two Summit County deputies
observed three suspicious vehicles around the Silver Summit area of Park City, Utah. The
deputies noticed a 1991 red and silver Dodge pick-up truck pajked on the side of the road. Karl
Hoppe was in the driver's seat. They also observed two off-highway vehicles (hereinafter
"OHV"), one driven by Amanda Kelson, the other by Robert McLaughlan. The deputies
contacted McLaughlin, who they believed was under the influence of a controlled substance.
When confronted, McLaughlin threw an object to the ground which police later determined was
methamphetamine.
A cooler was attached to the back of McLaughlin OHV. Inside the cooler, deputies
discovered chemicals and equipment they thought might be used to manufacture
methamphetamine. The police found a second cooler on the other OHV and arrested the driver,
Ms. Kelson. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered a small quantity of
methamphetamine on Ms. Kelson's person. The police also arrested Karl Hoppe, the driver of the
pick-up truck. All three were charged with possession of mtethamphetamine laboratory

2

The state conceded at the preliminary hearing, that because an all terrain vehicle is not a
motor vehicle, the most serious offense facing Mr. Fixmer is a class B misdemeanor theft offense.
3

The state moved to dismiss this charge at the preliminary hearing upon receipt of reports
from the state crime laboratory showing that no controlled substances or precursors were located
in Mr. Fixmer's home.
2

equipment, various traffic offenses and other drug charges.
The deputies learned that the trio picked up the OHV's at 747 Richmond Avenue in Park
City, Utah. Mark Fixmer and Page Guertzgen lived at the residence. Deputy Mike Grant
obtained a search warrant to search that residence. Upon entering the house, deputies found
Mark Fixmer "lying in bed," and Page Guertzgen in the living room. Guertzgen told police that
everything they were looking for was in the garage. Later that morning, Mr. Fixmer was
interviewed by Deputy Wilde.4 He told the deputy that Karl Hoppe and John McLaughlin were
Page Guertzgen's friends. He also told police that Karl Hoppe brought two four-wheelers to the
house around July 4, 2000, and asked for permission to store them in the garage. Hoppe later
brought additional items to the house for storage that he represented to Fixmer to be camping
equipment.
Police discovered no controlled substances, no chemical precursors used to manufacture
methamphetamine, and no items intended for the manufacture of methamphetamine in the home.
They did discovered a glass pipe and unidentified white powder, but subsequent laboratory tests
revealed neither controlled substances nor precursor chemicals. (Copies of the inventory list and
laboratory reports are attached as Addendum "A").
Despite the absence of drugs and precursor chemicals, the state nonetheless claims
"suspicious stains on thefloorof garage . . ." are somehow evidence of illegal conduct and the
matter should be bound.5 While one of the officers claimed to smell a chemical odor, he neither
4

That interviewed was tape-recorded by police. Unfortunately, either the police or the
prosecuting agency have lost or destroyed the tape.
5

Common sense would suggest that virtually every garage has stains on the floor
consistent with leaking oil, vehicle coolant, and automobile transmissionfluidand other

identified the smell nor linked the smell to illegal activity. In any event, the Utah crime laboratory
found that none of the suspected items contained controlled substances or precursor chemicals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AT PRELIMINARY HEARING
At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Fixmer argued that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to show that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed laboratory materials with the intent to
engage in a clandestine laboratory. Mr. Fixmer simply asked the court to apply established Utah
appellate court precedents, which support his argument that he committed no crime. Those cases
define constructive possession and support the magistrate's decision to dismiss. See e.g., State v.
Reed, Case No. 990973 (Utah App. 2000) (A copy of the court's decision is attached as
Addendum "B").
In the Reed case, the magistrate dismissed the possession of laboratory materials with
intent to engage in clandestine laboratory on the ground that Reed did not constructively possess
the alleged illegal items. Although Reed lived a home where controlled substance precursors and
laboratory equipment were found, the magistrate and court of appeals noted that other persons
also lived in the Reed home. The room containing the laboratory equipment was rented to
another person, there was no evidence that Reed had control over the room and its contents, there
were no controlled substances or precursors found among Reed's personal belongings, and Reed
made no incriminating statements.
Mr. Fixmer argued that his connection to the alleged clandestine laboratory materials was
even more attenuated than in Reed. Unlike Reed, the police here discovered neither laboratory
materials nor precursor chemicals in the home. Moreover, no drugs of any kind were found in the

unidentified substances.
4

home. Instead, the alleged laboratory components were found some distancefromthe home
secreted inside coolers tied to the back of four-wheelers. Those four-wheelers or OHV's were
driven by people largely unknown to Mr. Fixmer. Moreover, Mr. Fixmer made no incriminating
statements linking him to the laboratory components.6 Mr. Fixmer simply told police that he
believed that Karl Hoppe and John McLaughlin were storing camping equipment in the garage.7
These statements are insufficient to establish that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed laboratory
materials.
In summary Mr. Fixmer contended, and the magistrate agreed, that Reed and other Utah
appellate court precedents explained below, supported the court's order dismissing the charges
against Mr. Fixmer. Those additional cases mandate dismissal whenever the state fails to establish
a possessory link or nexus between the accused and the illegal item. See State v. Layman, 985
P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) ("it is necessary that there be a sufficient nexus between the accused and
the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drug."); State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) ("the
mere presence of the defendant in a [location where] illicit drugs are found does not, without
more, constitute sufficient proof of his possession of such drugs.); State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,

6

Arguably, the only incriminating statements were made by the home's other occupant,
Page Guertzgen. Guertzgen told police that the search items would be located in the garage.
Like in Reed, another occupant's knowledge and incriminating statements are insufficient to
establish guilt of a third party. See also State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)
("Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although
important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when
occupancy is not exclusive.")
7

The police processedfingerprintsfromthe laboratory components. No fingerprints
matched Mr. Fixmer. The only matched fingerprints belonged to John McLaughlan.
5

319 (Utah 1985) ("persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might
even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be
convicted of possession of a controlled substance.").
L THE COURT SHOULD ORDER FULL BRIEFING IN THIS MATTER TO
DECIDE THE APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE OF CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION PRECEDENT AT PRELIMINARY HEARINGS.
In factual scenarios similar to this case, both this court and the court of appeals, have
repeatedly reversed convictions finding that an accused did not constructively possess drugs,
paraphernalia, or laboratory materials. See Reed, Slip op. at 2. In ignoring this established
precedent, the state argues that "the magistrate's refusal to bind over on the meth lab charges . . .
amounts to a refusal to draw any prosecution favorable inferences . . . . Motion for Summary
Reversal, 8. The state contends that two prosecution favorable inferences can be drawn from the
evidence: (1) that Mr. Fixmer "had been duped into storing volatile meth (sic) lab equipment and
supplies in his garage; or (2) that Mr. Fixmer knew that meth (sic) lab materials were stored in the
garage.
In either instance, the state has failed to suflBcient evidence to support a bind over. See
State v. Clark, 20 P.2d 300, 303 (Utah 2001) (State must present "suflBcient evidence to establish
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it."). If Mr.
Fixmer was duped into storing laboratory equipment in his garage, then "viewing [the] evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the
prosecution," Clark, 20 P.3d at 303, the state has failed to prove that Mr. Fixmer committed a
crime. Under this scenario Mr. Fixmer lacks any knowledge that illegal items are stored in his
garage. There can be no crime under any standard of review if an accused does not know that
6

illegal items are stored in his home
Similarly, even assuming that Mr Fixmer "knew precisely what was in the garage/meth lab
and in the stolen ATV's

," as argued by the state, they have still failed to establish probable

cause to support a bind over Clark, 20 P 3d at 303 (The magistrate's role in this matter, while
limited, is not that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution

Even with this limited role, the

magistrate must attempt to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted
out no later than the preliminary hearing ") Knowledge of the presence of illegal substances in
the home, without more, is insufficient to show that crime has been committed Set Fox, 709
P 2d at 319 ("Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability "). The best evidence presented by
the state shows that Mr Fixmer may have known that illegal items were stored in his garage
This is insufficient to show that Mr Fixmer committed a crime
Moreover, Mr Fixmer5 s proximity to Kelson, McLaughlan, and Hoppe is an insufficient
basis upon which to conclude that he committed a drug crime See State v. Munsen, 821 P 2d 13,
15 (Utah App \99\)(quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U S 85, 91 (1979)) ("A 'person's mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person "),8 see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U S 47, 51-52
(1979) (mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain)

8

The state's argument that Mr Fixmer's presence in the company of others suspected of
crime should not be a factor in deciding whether he committed a crime
7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fixmer's case is factually and legally different than the Hoppe and Kelson cases. This
court should deny the state's motion for summary reversal and reinstate the briefing schedule in
this case. The magistrate in this case followed existing Utah appellate court precedent in refusing
to bind over Mr. Fixmer. Accordingly, Mr. Fixmer objects to the state's motion for summary
reversal and asks that this matter proceed in the normal course of the appellate process.

DATED this jO

day of September, 2001.

RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Appellee Mark Fixmer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing TO MOTION TO STAY UTAH SUPREME
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN COMPANION
CASES was mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following , this / O day of September, 2001
Assistant Attorney General Marian Decker
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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, MLLD
Utah Court of Appeals

OCT 0 1 2001
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PaulettB Stagg
Clerk of the Court

ooOoo
State of Utah,

ORDER DENYING
SUMMARY REVERSAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20010241-CA

Mark Fixmer,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary
reversal based on the Utah Supreme Court1s order in the companion
cases, State v. Hoppe (20010523-SC) and State v. Kelsen
(20010524-SC) wherein the Supreme Court ordered remand to this
court with instructions to reverse the magistrate's order
quashing the bind-over and requiring the magistrate to bind-over
both defendants on the first degree felony charges. However, we
have concluded the case before this court is factually
distinguishable from the companion cases and summary reversal is
not appropriate in this case.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary reversal is
denied and a ruling on the issues raised therin is deferred
pending the plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal.
Appellant's brief is to be filed with this court no later than
November 13, 2001.
Dated this /

day of CcptGrnbor, 2001.

FOR THE COURT:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

ADDENDUM

Utah Case Law
STATE v. REED, 2000 UT App 258,

P. 3d

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeff Claude REED,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 990973-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
September 8, 2000.

(Not For Official Publication)

Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable
William Barrett.
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BENCH, Judge:
The State argues that because actual involvement m a zlai f c st_ t__
_latr_ is not an element of the offense charged, it was not required
to establish an actual physical connection between defendant and
the _1^>. located in his residence. Although we agree that showing a
physical connection between defendant and an operating laboratory
is not required, the statute does require the State to establish
that defendant, intending to "engage in a iLldii^:tme> laboratory
operation," actually possessed the controlled substance precursor,
or laboratory equipment, or supplies. Utah Code Ann. §
58-37d-4(1)(a) & (b) (1998) (providing it is unlawful to knowingly
or intentionally "possess" such items "with the intent to engage
m a j^lana~^-a.ic-_ laboratory operation") . Further, in order to
prove constructive possession, "it is necessary that there [be] a
sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug [or
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
drug [or paraphernalia].'" State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 13,
Qft5 P 2d 311 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Fox,
n
Q^ P 2d ilC, 319 (Utah 1985)). In determining whether there is
constructive possession, we may "consider[] factors that were
considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a
factually-similar context." Id. at f 15.
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant lived in
the house for approximately three weeks before the controlled
substance precursors and laboratory equipment were found. Alone,
this is not enough to establish constructive possession See Fox,
709 P 2d at 319 (stating "[o]wnership and/or occupancy of the
premises upon which the drugs are found, although important

jr age Z O I Z

factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive
possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive"). The room
containing the laboratory was rented to someone other than
defendant, and there was no evidence indicating that defendant had
any control over the room or its contents. See id. (providing one
factor of constructive possession may be "presence of drugs in a
specific area over which the accused had control"). No controlled
substance precursors or laboratory equipment were found among
defendant's personal effects, see id. (providing another factor of
constructive possession may be "presence of drug paraphernalia
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the
accused has special control"), and defendant made no incriminating
statements connecting him to the laboratory found in the house.
See id. Simply put, the evidence does not ""permit an inference
that [defendant] had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control 1 " over the contraband found in the downstairs
bedroom. Layman, 1999 UT 79 at f 13 (quoting Fox. 709 P.2d at
319). Therefore, because the State did not "produce enough
evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict
with respect to each element of the crime, " the trial court
properly quashed the bmdover. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438
(Utah 1998).
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE, JR., Judge.
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